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Turkey: has the AKP ended its winning streak? 
Marek Matusiak
Since the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Turkey in 2002, it 
has enjoyed a constant winning streak: it won each election (with a support level of 49.83% in 
2011), subordinated the army (which had de facto stood above the civilian government) and 
was reforming the country. The situation in the country was stable (especially when compared 
to the crises and restlessness in the 1990s), the economy was booming, Turkey’s position in 
regional politics was strengthening, and Ankara’s significance on the international arena was 
growing. This encouraged the ruling class to make long-term plans, leading up to the hun-
dredth anniversary of the republic in 2023. In the coming decade, Turkey governed by the AKP 
was to become one of the global economic and political centres, a full member of the EU and 
at the same time a political and economic leader in the Middle East. 
However, the negative trends in the situation both domestically (mass public protests, the de-
adlocked Kurdish issue and the unsuccessful attempt to amend the constitution) and abroad 
(the war in Syria and the coup in Egypt) seen over the past few months have laid bare the limi-
tations of the AKP’s rule and have affected the government’s democratic mandate, prestige and 
credibility on the international arena, as well as peace and order and domestic security. 
When compared to the beginning of 2013, the way the situation will develop in Turkey is at this 
moment definitely less predictable; and the possible scenarios include both relative peace (howe-
ver, with socio-political tension present in the background) and the threat of destabilisation. The-
refore, although the AKP will still remain the sole major political force, this party will have to face 
challenges which will decide not only its political future but also the directions the country will be 
developing in. However, a comprehensive solution of the accumulated problems and a simple re-
turn to the status quo ante, convenient to the government, seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Protests in Gezi Park: 
social tension is growing 
The protests which commenced in the last days 
of May in Istanbul and were repeated irregu-
larly on a smaller scale also this autumn were 
the first sign of public dissatisfaction under 
the AKP’s rule to be so clear. The protests were 
sparked by a local issue (resistance to the plans 
to liquidate Gezi Park in the centre of Istanbul). 
However, they quickly developed into massive 
political demonstrations, expanding across 
most major urban centres, where participants 
expressed their resistance to police brutality, 
self-censorship in the media, the arrogance and 
the arbitrary and confrontational style of Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy, and the 
government’s decision concerning moral issues 
(including restrictions on the sale of alcohol). 
As seen from a broader perspective, the protest 
was a manifestation of the dissatisfaction which 
part of the public (above all, the secular middle 
class) has with Turkey’s political system, which is 
democratic in terms of electoral procedures, but 
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is far from being a liberal democracy as regards 
political culture and the system of values. This 
is what makes the protests which were initiat-
ed at Gezi clearly distinct from the ‘Arab Spring’ 
(a social revolt against decades of dictator-
ship and poverty), to which they have been 
compared, and rather brings them closer to 
the tradition of protest movements existing 
in the Western world. 
These protests have not shaken the support 
for the ruling party; the uncompromising 
stance taken by the prime minister has met 
with approval among the conservative part of 
the Turkish public (the approval rating for the 
AKP was 43.2% in July as compared to 35.3% 
in June; data from Metropoll). However, they 
have caused an upsurge in domestic tension, 
far-reaching social polarisation, an increase in 
the AKP’s negative electorate (which has  not, 
though, translated into growing support for 
any of the existing opposition parties), and 
a clear deterioration of the government’s image 
in the international community. 
For this reason, the government has been mak-
ing attempts to regain the initiative. On 30 Sep-
tember, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the 
content of the Democratisation Package, aimed 
at improving democratic standards in the coun-
try. Some elements of this package are definite-
ly major changes as compared to the previous 
history of the Republic of Turkey. These include 
the final removal of restrictions – with the excep-
tion of the judicial system and law enforcement 
agencies – in the dress code of state officials (the 
headscarf issue), the new possibility for private 
schools to be opened which do not have Turkish 
as the language of instruction (in response to the 
national aspirations of the Kurdish minority), the 
right to hold electoral campaigns in the languag-
es of ethnic minorities, and lowering the support 
level (from 7% to 3%) received by a party in an 
election required for it to get funds from the state 
budget. The prime minister has also announced 
that a discussion on a possible reduction of the 
10% electoral threshold will commence. Never-
theless, the wait of many months for this pack-
age which was kept secret until the last moment, 
turned out to contain changes which, although 
to the liking of the conservative Sunni Turkish 
majority, are definitely below the expectations 
of the ethnic and religious minority groups. This 
is not only in comparison to the maximum pro-
gramme suggested by the Kurdish minority (ed-
ucation in minority languages at public schools 
and an immediate reduction of the electoral 
threshold) but also in comparison to specula-
tion in the press preceding the announcement 
of the package (the expected changes included 
the right to use the Kurdish language at public 
institutions, official state recognition of the Alevi 
minority, changes in legislation regarding com-
bating terrorism and  the Greek Orthodox theo-
logical seminary at Heybeli island – closed since 
the 1970s – being re-opened). 
Given this situation, the package may help the 
AKP temporarily rebuild its tarnished image. 
However, this is a policy of limited concessions, 
which have not been consulted with the groups 
they concern and which have de facto been giv-
en to the public arbitrarily by the prime minister 
and the confrontational approach towards crit-
ics is still in place; taken together, this is rather 
unlikely to ease the social tension, nor will it 
remove the causes which brought about the 
public unrest this summer. 
All this will make it difficult for Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan to capitalise politically on the package, 
which under different circumstances would 
have restored his old reputation as a reformer 
and democrat to a certain extent. This is espe-
The protests have not shaken the support 
for the AKP, but they have caused an up-
surge in domestic tension, social polar-
isation and a clear deterioration of the 
government’s image in the international 
community.
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cially so since the autocratic style of his policy 
seems to be one of the key causes of the pro-
tests. However, barring a deterioration in his 
health (it has been speculated for years that he 
has cancer), Erdoğan looks set to be a constant 
element in the Turkish political landscape. 
Therefore, as elections loom (a local election is 
scheduled for March and the presidential elec-
tion for summer 2014) more manifestations of 
public dissatisfaction should be expected. There 
is no risk that the AKP will lose the election. 
What is at stake is the level of support it garners 
and the strength of its democratic mandate. At 
present, the excellent result achieved by the 
party in 2011 (49.83%) allows Prime Minister 
Erdoğan to claim that his policy is uncondition-
ally backed by 50% of the public.
Nevertheless, even if the AKP’s victory is convinc-
ing, its continued rule (with the present political 
approach continued) will result in an increasingly 
tense atmosphere in public life which will tarnish 
the image of Turkey as a democratic and stable 
state. As Suat  Kınıklıoğlu, a former prominent 
member of the AKP, admitted in his column in 
the “Today’s Zaman” daily: “Even if the ruling 
party garners 60 per cent of the vote in March, 
there will be no peace in this country.1”
In this context, given the strong Turkish tradi-
tion of radical political movements (leftist, na-
tionalist, Islamic and also those combining the 
elements of various ideologies), it is possible to 
envisage the protests taking on a more radical 
form and extremist groups becoming activated. 
The attack on the central police headquarters in 
Ankara (victimless) launched at night on 20 Sep-
1 http://todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.
action?newsId=326087
tember by one of the leftist terrorist organisa-
tions “in retaliation for the deaths of six people” 
during the Gezi and later protests was possibly 
a portent of this. 
The Middle East: more threats than 
opportunities
Another front which carries great challenges 
at home and abroad is the policy towards the 
Middle East. The AKP’s political identity is a key 
element of a broader project in foreign policy 
which provides for building Turkish influence in 
the areas of the former Ottoman Empire and 
a part of this is its openness to the region.
Turkey’s political and economic position in the 
Middle East, which has seen uninterrupted 
growth since 2002 owing to the AKP’s policy, 
has been strengthening Ankara’s aspirations to 
regional leadership, raising Turkey’s rank in the 
international arena and bolstering the AKP’s le-
gitimacy at home. 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring was seen by 
the Erdoğan government as an opportunity for 
an accelerated fulfilment of its ambitions. By 
offering strong support to the rule of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Egypt, whose views have 
a certain degree of affinity to those of the AKP, 
and to the opposition in Syria2, Turkey was hop-
ing it would become a senior political partner 
for Cairo and one of the key forces that would 
deal the cards in post-war Syria. However, the 
coup in Egypt laid bare Turkey’s helplessness 
and isolation in regional politics. In turn, the 
way the situation is developing in Syria (increas-
ing radicalisation of the opposition forces3, and 
2 Offering shelter and support (logistics, training and 
equipment) to the opposition political and military 
structures, making its territory available for the transfer 
of personnel and weapons, and also medical treatment 
and the redeployment of forces, and, last but not least, 
lobbying for international intervention.
3 At present, around 1,000 various factions are report-
edly fighting in Syria, almost half of which are radical 
Islamists. Cf. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-reb-
el-fighters-are-jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-
Janes-report.html 
The coup in Egypt laid bare Turkey’s iso-
lation in regional politics. The situation in 
Syria is generating ever more threats to 
stability and security in Turkey.
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in fact the disintegration of the country) is caus-
ing Turkey to worry about the fact that the bor-
der between the two countries is about 900 km 
long and the threats originating from Syria are 
becoming increasingly painful for Turkey. 
The risk that the conflict will spill over to Tur-
key is real. This country has already accepted 
over 500,000 refugees4 (according to UN esti-
mates, this number could grow to one million 
by the end of this year5). Since the situation in 
Syria is permanently unstable, it is difficult to 
predict when they will be able to return. This 
means not only a significant financial burden6 
but also a serious destabilising factor. The scale 
of this phenomenon has led the government to 
start losing control of the human flow across 
the border, which enables movement between 
the two countries not only to refugees but also 
to smugglers, Muslim radicals, the Syrian secret 
services and PKK militants. 
One vivid example of the threats this is posing 
is provided by the terrorist attack in Reyhanlı, 
a small frontier town, in May this year, where 
52 people were killed (the circumstances of this 
attack remain unexplained). Clashes between 
Turkish law enforcement agencies and groups 
attempting to illegally cross the border have 
also been observed. 
Furthermore, given the special features of the 
frontier area, which in ethnic and religious 
terms is in fact an extension of Syria, the situ-
ation in Syria is immediately affecting the area 
on the Turkish side of the border. The fact that 
Sunni insurgents backed by Ankara are cross-
ing the border and the mass influx of refugees 
mostly Sunni Arabs opposed to the regime is 
generating tension between Kurds living on 
the Turkish side of the border (who support the 
4 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224
5 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/flash_read.php?ID=142
6 Since the beginning of the conflict, the refugee main-
tenance cost has exceeded US$1 billion, data from 
ICG: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/
turkey-cyprus/turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-
spillover-risks-for-turkey.pdf 
Kurdish movement in Syria, which the Islamic 
insurgents are fighting, with Turkey’s support) 
and the Alawite Arabic minority (who support 
the regime in Damascus). This especially gives 
rise to threats in the frontier province, Hatay, 
where tension resulting from war and the in-
flux of refugees is becoming mixed up with the 
tension generated by the recent public protests 
(three people were killed in clashes with the 
police in this province). At the same time, infor-
mation has been received that Turkish citizens 
are leaving for Syria to take part in the ‘Jihad’ 
against the Bashar al-Assad regime (it is diffi-
cult to estimate the scale of this phenomenon)7.
As the conflict is continuing, Turkey’s political 
and territorial engagement in it is increasing. 
At the same time, its influence on the develop-
ments in Syria is constantly diminishing and the 
threat that instability will spill over is growing 
as are Turkey’s financial and political costs, both 
at home (72% of the public are opposed to the 
intervention8) and in the international arena. 
All this is calling into question not only the fu-
ture shape of Turkey’s relations with the Middle 
East and the future of the ‘neo-Ottoman’ proj-
ect, but also the country’s security and stabil-
ity. This is even more pertinent since, even if 
al-Assad is defeated, the scenario which Ankara 
desires most, Turkey will remain with a durably 
unstable neighbourhood. 
7 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/radikal_turkiyeden_
suriyeye_savas_icin_goturulenlerin_aileleriyle_konustu-
adiyaman___suriye_cihat_hatti-1152993 
8 http://trends.gmfus.org/survey-u-s-european-and-turk-
ish-publics-oppose-intervention-in-syrian-conflict-fa-
vor-democracy-over-stability-in-mena-region/#lightbox/0/ 
As the conflict in Syria is continuing, 
Turkey’s political and territorial engage-
ment in it is increasing. At the same time, 
its influence on the developments there is 
constantly diminishing.
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Kurds: a deadlock in the peace process?
The attempt to settle the issue of the Kurdish mi-
nority in Turkey is also becoming complicated9. 
It was launched by the AKP government in the 
first half of this year. The leader of the Kurdish 
guerrilla forces (PKK) Abdullah Öcalan, who has 
been imprisoned since 1999, has been involved 
in this project. Öcalan’s message, in which he 
declared a ceasefire and a gradual withdrawal 
of militants from Turkey, and above all, set a per-
spective for a political resolution of the Kurdish 
issue within the Turkish state, was announced 
to the general public on 21 March. The PKK’s 
field command embarked upon the fulfilment of 
these promises10. However, on 5 September, this 
organisation announced it would halt the with-
drawal of militants and accused the government 
in Ankara of failing to fulfil its obligations under 
the agreements and of using the ceasefire for its 
own short-term goals (ensuring itself a good re-
sult in local elections in 2014 and strengthening 
the position of the law enforcement agencies) 
without intending to really resolve the issue. 
9 Approximately 10–20% of Turkey’s residents. A long his-
tory of discrimination and persecution in the republican 
period; armed struggle in the south-eastern part of the 
country waged by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
since the 1980s. Outcome: around 30,000 victims and 
losses of US$300 billion. After temporary peace at the 
beginning of the 21st century as a consequence of the 
detention of the movement’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, 
the PKK intensified its activity in 2011 (partly due to the 
new regional circumstances created by the Arab Spring 
and the civil war in Syria).  
10 According to information from the PKK, around 600 mil-
itants were withdrawn from Turkey between May and 
the end of August.
The PKK’s announcement has cast doubt on the 
future of the peace process and long-term sta-
bility in the south-eastern part of the country. 
The successful completion of this process would 
bring an end to a long and bloody conflict, 
would strengthen the country’s security and 
would allow the government regain much of 
the prestige it has lost. A possible failure (anoth-
er one after the unsuccessful attempt in 2009) 
could however ruin the chance that this conflict 
could be settled in the predictable future. 
It is difficult to determine the likelihood of military 
action being resumed by the PKK. The struggle in 
Syria to set up a Kurdish autonomy in the north 
of the country could stop the PKK from re-open-
ing the Turkish front. On the other hand, the ap-
proaching election season would be a convenient 
moment to destabilise the situation in Turkish 
Kurdistan and to make a display of its force. 
Beyond any doubt, the PKK will be putting 
more and more pressure on the government 
and strengthening both its political11 and or-
ganisational influence (setting up a kind of un-
derground state). Unless this issue is resolved 
politically, this is likely to merely postpone 
a confrontation with the Turkish state. 
In its attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue the 
government is trying to satisfy, at least part-
ly, Kurdish expectations, and thus marginalise 
the PKK: to deprive it of its arguments and thus 
make it impossible for the PKK to identify itself 
with the Kurdish minority per se. This means it 
is necessary to navigate between the minority’s 
national aspirations (including the demands 
regarding culture, language, education and 
granting more power to local authorities) on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, between 
the national sentiments of the Turkish majority 
and the threat of upsetting the country’s uni-
11 The leftist-nationalist PKK (Marxist roots) wants to be-
come the only party representing all Kurds in Turkey and 
Syria (its political position in Iraq, the military base of this 
movement, is weak) and has consistently fought other 
political forces. Examples over the past few weeks in Tur-
key include attacks on the offices of the Islamic party Hur 
Dava, which is linked to the Kurdish Hizbullah.
The PKK will be putting increasing pressure 
on the government and strengthening both 
its political and organisational influence. 
This means that unless this issue is re-
solved politically, a confrontation with the 
Turkish state will be merely postponed.
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ty. Although the PKK has officially given up its 
desire to separate Kurdistan from Turkey, the 
proposal to set up a “democratic autonomy” is 
making the government concerned that, should 
the PKK’s demands be fulfilled, independence 
from Ankara could be obtained step by step by 
means of fait accompli, without the national 
framework being openly upset. This concern is 
growing, especially given the fact that the uni-
tary systems in Iraq and Syria have collapsed. 
The Democratic Package announced by the 
government as a milestone in the peace process 
turned out to be below the expectations of the 
Kurdish minority and has failed to meet all of 
their key demands, such as: the right to educa-
tion in their native language, releasing Kurdish 
national activists from prisons, the reduction of 
the 10% electoral threshold, increasing the pre-
rogatives of the local governments, withdraw-
ing support for the groups who fight against 
Kurds in Syria, and also – a demand which Turk-
ish public opinion find especially difficult to ac-
cept – changing the conditions in which Abdul-
lah Öcalan is serving his sentence.
Given this situation, it appears that it will be 
difficult to break the deadlock in the peace pro-
cess, especially as the election year is approach-
ing and the ‘siege mentality’ is clearly on the 
rise in government circles (facing domestic and 
external problems). However, a possible post-
ponement in the finalisation of the peace pro-
cess until a time after elections will probably 
lead to this process failing. 
The unadopted constitution: 
the uncertain future of the AKP elite
Prime Minister Erdoğan also needs to face a num-
ber of problems inside his political camp, includ-
ing the question concerning his own future. The 
unsuccessful amendment of the constitution 
which the government wanted to enact between 
2011 (parliamentary election) and 2014–2015 
(local, presidential and parliamentary elections) 
has blocked the implementation of the political 
strategy which had been designed to be applied 
in the upcoming electoral season. Pursuant to it, 
Erdoğan was to be elected president of Turkey 
in 2014 (in the first general presidential election 
in the republic’s history and at a time when the 
country’s political system was to be changed into 
the presidential system), while a great part of in-
fluential figures from the party and the govern-
ment would take positions in local governments12.
This would have given Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
an actual monopoly of power in the party and 
in the state, and the perspective that he would 
rule the country for another decade and would 
lead Turkey through the symbolic date, the 
year 2023, the republic’s hundredth anniversa-
ry. This would have offered the opportunity to 
draw parallels between him and the founder of 
the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
These plans were thwarted. The AKP has no in-
dependent constitutional majority, and an open 
link between the work on a new constitution 
and Erdoğan’s project to strengthen his power 
gave rise to resistance among the opposition 
parties and doubts among the general public13.
As a consequence, the AKP is entering the ap-
12 According to the AKP’s internal regulations, its members 
can hold the same positions in the state administration 
and party structures for three consecutive government 
tenures as a maximum. The regulations in the present 
form will eliminate the vast majority of key politicians 
from the government and the party after the present 
parliamentary tenure is over. The adoption of the act 
in 2012 increasing the number of cities with metropolis 
status from 16 to 30 since local elections in 2014 was an 
element of preparing the ground for transferring these 
officials to positions in local administration. 
13 39.8% were against and 35.2% were in favour of the 
presidential system in April this year, cf. http://www.
metropoll.com.tr/report /turkiyenin-nabzi-yeni-co-
zum-sureci-nisan-2013 
The AKP is entering the electoral sea-
son in the state of uncertainty about the 
country’s system and the political future 
of dozens of leading politicians who now 
form the government elite.
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proaching electoral season in a state of uncer-
tainty about the country’s system and the polit-
ical future of dozens of leading politicians who 
now form the government elite. 
The person who has benefited from the failure 
of Erdoğan’s plans (which were not unilateral-
ly accepted even within the AKP) is the second 
historic leader of this party, President Abdullah 
Gül. He, as compared to the autocratic and con-
frontational Erdoğan, is ever more clearly build-
ing his image as a conciliatory politician who is 
true to the reformative and democratic trends in 
politics. An open conflict between the two ap-
pears unlikely, especially given the much weaker 
position of the president within the party and 
the state apparatus. However, Gül’s growing 
popularity (an approval rating of 76.5% as com-
pared to 63% for the prime minister; data from 
Metropoll, August 2013) is an obstacle for Er-
doğan in his desire to take a monopoly of pow-
er. The more so, that in the public debate opin-
ions are ever more frequently appearing, that 
it is the prime minister who is leading the par-
ty and the state in the wrong direction due to 
his personal ambitions and hardline approach, 
while the political formula of the AKP, which is 
a conservative-democratic party with Islamic 
roots and is aimed at democratisation and re-
forming the state, is still popular and promising. 
The continuation of this trend in the party could 
be guaranteed if it was led by Abdullah Gül14. 
Furthermore, the president is liked and support-
14 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/a-future-with-gul.
aspx?pageID=449&nID=54626&NewsCatID=411 
ed by the remarkably influential religious com-
munity, the Fethullah Gülen Movement (Gülen 
is a Muslim religious leader and scholar, who are 
at odds with the prime minister. 
Conclusion
The 1980s in Turkey was a period strongly af-
fected domestically by the military coup of 1980 
and by martial law being in force until 1987, and 
in foreign terms, by the intensifying feeling of 
being encircled by the USSR and its clients and 
satellites on the one hand and by the Islamic Re-
public of Iran on the other. In turn, the first post-
Cold War decade in the 1990s was marked by 
strong social, political and economic upheaval. 
Against this background, the period 2002- 
-2013 brought stability, increasing welfare and 
a strengthening international position to the 
country. Turkey under the AKP’s rule was more 
and more seen as an emerging regional power, 
stable, undergoing democratisation, with a young 
society and a growing economy, radiating with 
a positive example to all the neighbouring regions 
plunged in problems: the Balkans, the Southern 
Caucasus and the Middle East. 
At present, for the first time in a decade, the 
AKP government is encountering major imped-
iments both domestically and internationally, 
and the party’s image has been tarnished due 
to doubts as to the authenticity of its commit-
ment to the ideals of a liberal secular democra-
cy. This situation is a test for both the govern-
ment’s ambitions and the country’s aspirations 
to become a powerful state. 
